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Mikos: POTUS and Pot

POTUS AND POT: WHY THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT
LEGALIZE MARIJUANA THROUGH EXECUTIVE ACTION
Robert A. Mikos*

Could the President legalize marijuana, without waiting for Congress
to act? The 2020 Presidential Election showed that this question is far
from hypothetical. Seeking to capitalize on frustration with the slow pace
of federal legislative reform, several presidential candidates promised
they would bypass the logjam in Congress and legalize marijuana through
executive action instead.
This Essay warns that such promises are both misguided and dangerous
because they ignore statutory and constitutional constraints on the
President’s authority to effect legal change. It explains why supporters of
marijuana reform should be wary of legalizing the drug through executive
action, even if that means having to wait for Congress to pass new
legislation.
To be clear, this Essay is not a defense of our current federal marijuana
policy. Federal marijuana policy is a mess, regardless of one’s views on
legalization. But proponents of reform need to recognize that Congress
made this mess, and only Congress can clean it up. Proponents of reform
should resist the temptation to embrace the imperial presidency to serve
their short-term policy goals, for there is much more at stake here than
marijuana policy.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Section I sets the stage by discussing
the growing interest in pursuing legalization via executive action. Section
II then illuminates the current limits on the President’s power to legalize
marijuana. Finally, Section III explains why disregarding those limits is
dangerous, and why marijuana reforms should run the gauntlet that is our
national lawmaking process—even if that means we are stuck with an
outdated federal marijuana policy for some time.
I. THE ALLURE OF LEGALIZING MARIJUANA THROUGH EXECUTIVE
ACTION
Public support for legalizing marijuana–and not just for medical
purposes–has skyrocketed over the past few decades, as shown by the
Gallup polling data depicted in Figure 1.1
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Felix Chang and the editors of the University of
Cincinnati Law Review for organizing the 2020 Corporate Law Symposium: A Fresh Take on Cannabis
Regulation. This Essay is based on my keynote address at the symposium. I also thank Sam Heller and
Ben Nicols for excellent research assistance.
1. Data for the graph are taken from Jeffrey Jones, U.S. Support for Legal Marijuana Steady in
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Figure 1: Public Support for Legalization
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Back in 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), the federal statute that bans the production, distribution, and
possession of marijuana, 2 only twelve percent of Americans supported
legalization. Now, by contrast, sixty-six percent of Americans do. In other
words, nearly two-thirds of the American public now favors legalizing the
drug, irrespective of the purposes for which it is used.
Just as remarkably, support for legalization is not confined to certain
parts of the country. Before the 2020 elections, twelve states across the
nation and the political spectrum had already legalized the drug for
recreational purposes.3 Recent public opinion polls show that legalization
draws strong support in a large number of other states as well, including
some surprising places, like Arizona (62% favor legalization), 4 Kansas

Past Year, GALLUP (Oct. 23, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267698/support-legal-marijuanasteady-past-year.aspx.
2. The statute is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
3. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. An additional twenty-two states
have legalized the drug for medical purposes.
4. Poll: Arizona Opposition to Marijuana Legalization Goes up in Smoke, OH PREDICTIVE
INSIGHTS (Jul. 21, 2020), https://ohpredictive.com/press-releases/az-opposition-to-marijuana/.
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(61%),5 South Dakota (60%),6 Texas (54%),7 and Montana (54%).8 In
fact, it is now difficult to find a state poll where the majority does not
favor legalization.9
Even though few policy proposals draw as much support in as many
parts of the country as does the legalization of marijuana,10 Congress has
thus far failed to repeal the federal ban on the drug. Proposals to legalize
marijuana at the federal level,11 or at least to allow states to opt out of the
federal ban,12 have repeatedly stalled in Congress, rarely even making
their way out of committee. 13 In the quarter century since California
adopted the first major state-level marijuana reform in 1996 – the
Compassionate Use Act, which legalized medical marijuana in the state,14
Congress has made only two modest reforms to federal marijuana policy.
Since 2014, it has attached a rider to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
annual budget, blocking the agency from prosecuting violations of the
federal marijuana ban, at least when the violators have acted in strict
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.15 Additionally, in 2018,
5. JIAN SUN, THE DOCKING INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS FORT HAYES ST. UNIV., KANSAS SPEAKS
FALL 2019 STATEWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (Nov. 2019), https://www.fhsu.edu/docking/KansasSpeaks/kansas-speaks-report_fall-2019-final.
6. Joe Sneve, Poll: Most South Dakota Voters Support Marijuana Legalization, ARGUS LEADER
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2020/09/18/poll-most-south-dakota-voterssupport-legalizing-marijuana/5828238002/.
7. Legalization of Marijuana, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Feb. 2019),
https://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/set/legalization-marijuana-february-2019.
8. Montana Poll Examines ERA Knowledge, Marijuana Legalization Data Regulations, UNIV.
OF MON., (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.umt.edu/news/2020/02/022820poll.php.
9. Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Policy Should be Set by the Federal Government, Not the States,
in DEBATING REFORM: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON HOW TO FIX THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
51 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson, eds.) (4th ed. 2020).
10. For an overview of the divisions in American public opinion on other issues, see generally In
a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarized-era-sharp-divides-in-bothpartisan-coalitions/.
11. See,
e.g.,
MORE
Act
of
2019,
S.
2227,
116th
Cong.
(2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2227.
12. See STATES Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/3032/all-info. For my analysis of the STATES Act, see Robert A. Mikos, Analysis of
the Warren-Gardner STATES Act, MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY BLOG (June 7, 2018),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/06/analysis-of-the-warren-gardner-states-act/.
13. In early fall 2020, for example, House Democrats postponed a floor vote on the MORE Act
until after the 2020 election, choosing instead to focus on other priorities, like the COVID-19 pandemic.
See Madeleine Ngo & Natalie Andrews, House Democrats Postpone Vote on Decriminalizing Marijuana,
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2020, 6:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-democrats-postpone-voteon-decriminalizing-marijuana-11600381177.
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5.
15. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, §
538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). Although the terms of the spending rider are susceptible to different
readings, at least one federal appeals court has interpreted it to bar the DOJ from using any funds to
prosecute individuals “engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana Laws and who fully
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Congress narrowed the definition of “marijuana” to exclude nonpsychoactive cannabis plants, which Congress rechristened as “hemp.” 16
While these two reforms should not be dismissed out of hand, they fall
far short of legalizing marijuana writ large. Federal law continues to
impose a variety of sanctions and limitations on individuals engaged in
the possession, production, or distribution of marijuana, even when those
individuals faithfully comply with all state marijuana laws. Among other
disadvantages, state-licensed marijuana suppliers cannot easily obtain
basic banking services;17 they cannot seek protection under federal
bankruptcy18 or trademark laws19; they cannot deduct certain business
expenses when calculating their federal tax liabilities; 20 they cannot apply
for Small Business Administration loans, including any of the $659
billion made available under the CARES Act in response to the 2020
coronavirus pandemic;21 and they face civil lawsuits brought by private
plaintiffs seeking treble damages under the federal Civil RICO statute. 22
While there may be a truce between the federal government and reform
states, it is, at most, a limited truce.23
Congress’s failure to pass marijuana reform legislation by this point
may seem puzzling. However, the Constitution makes the passage of
federal legislation difficult by design, regardless of the subject involved. 24
For example, the equal allocation of Senate seats gives small states an

complied with such laws.” United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).
16. Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted),
https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Agriculture%20Improvement%20Act%20of%20201
8.pdf. For an explanation of how the 2018 Farm Bill changed federal marijuana law, see Robert A. Mikos,
The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 15 (2020).
17. See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 597 (2015).
18. E.g., In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 847 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015)(“Can a debtor in the marijuana
business obtain relief in the federal bankruptcy court? No.”).
19. E.g., In re Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
20. See generally Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV.
523 (2014).
21. Kyle Jaeger, Marijuana Businesses are Ineligible for Coronavirus Disaster Relief, Federal
Agency Confirms, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/marijuanabusinesses-are-ineligible-for-coronavirus-disaster-relief-federal-agency-confirms/.
22. E.g., Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017). See also Robert A. Mikos,
UPDATE: Plaintiff Loses Colorado RICO Lawsuit (Safe Streets), MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY
BLOG (Nov. 1. 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/11/update-plaintiff-loses-coloradorico-lawsuit-safe-streets/.
23. See Mikos, supra note16, at 10-14.
24. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 34-60 (2006) (discussing features of
national political process that hinder passage of federal laws); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers
As A Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2001) (observing that “the procedures
established by the Constitution make adoption of [federal] law more difficult by requiring the participation
and assent of multiple actors”).
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outsized influence in Congress. This allows Senators from states like
Wyoming, Idaho, and Nebraska–none of which has legalized even
medical marijuana–to hold up the adoption of legislation that is popular
elsewhere. The obstacles to passing federal legislation are hardly
insurmountable–Congress does legislate, after all–but the process takes
time and is not for the impatient.
The states have been quicker to adopt marijuana reforms largely
because they face fewer anti-majoritarian obstacles in their lawmaking
processes.25 For example, the states do not (and may not) give less
populous parts of the state a disproportionate vote in the state legislature,
in the same way that the Constitution gives less populous states in the
Union a disproportionate vote in the Senate. 26 Perhaps even more
importantly, many states allow the people to enact laws directly, thereby
bypassing the state legislature and any procedural obstacles that might
hinder the passage of legislation therein. 27 Indeed, it is telling that many
states have pursued marijuana reforms via ballot initiative, rather than
through normal legislation passed by their state legislatures.28
Given the growing popularity of marijuana legalization, it is hardly
surprising that reform proponents are seeking other routes to legalize
marijuana federally–routes that do not require running the “gauntlet” that
is the national legislative process.29 Seizing upon the pent-up demand for
reform, several Presidential candidates during the fall 2020 election
suggested that they would, if elected, quickly legalize marijuana, without
waiting for Congress to act. For example, erstwhile Democratic candidate
Senator Bernie Sanders boldly promised that, as President, he would
“Legalize marijuana in the first 100 days with executive action.” 30 Indeed,

25. See Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1689
(2007) (comparing state and federal lawmaking procedures and observing that, “[i]n many respects, it is
easier to pass populist legislation at the state level”).
26. Id. at 1689-91.
27. Id.
28. See ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY 291 (Wolters Kluwer
2017) (noting that “nearly half (14 of 29) of the state medical marijuana laws that were adopted through
2016 . . . were adopted via ballot initiative,” and that “all nine jurisdictions that [had] legalized recreational
marijuana through 2016 had done so via ballot initiative”).
29. Apart from seeking executive action, legalization advocates have filed lawsuits asking the
courts to declare that the federal marijuana ban is unconstitutional on various grounds. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Sessions, No. 17 Civ. 5625 (AKH), 2018 WL 1114758 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018)
(dismissing complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
30. See
Legalizing
Marijuana,
BERNIE
SANDERS
CAMPAIGN
WEBSITE,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/legalizing-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/32D3-UQH7] (last visited Jan.
24, 2021). Senator Sanders also promised to expunge past marijuana-related convictions, tax marijuana
sales and reinvest those proceeds “in communities hardest hit by the War on Drugs”, and limit the
concentration of the marijuana industry to ensure that it does not become another “big tobacco.” Id.
Because it is unclear whether Senator Sanders intended to do such things through executive action rather
than through new legislation, I will focus on the first prong of his campaign promise—i.e., to legalize
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in a speech delivered just two days before Iowa’s first-in-the-nation
caucus, Sanders accelerated his timetable, promising that, “On my first
day in office through executive order we will legalize marijuana in every
state in this country.”31 Sanders’s promise was unequivocal: he claimed
he could and would legalize marijuana—for recreational and medical
use—quickly, and without “wait[ing] for Congress to act.”32
In similar fashion, Senator Elizabeth Warren embraced the idea of
legalization through executive action. Although she held out hope that
Congress might pass new legislation, Senator Warren made clear her view
that new legislation was not necessary. Like Sanders, she promised that,
if elected, she would act quickly to legalize marijuana using the
President’s executive authority. Elaborating somewhat, Warren promised
that, as President, she would
act decisively on legalization starting on day one. I’ll appoint agency heads,
including at the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, who support legalization. In my first 100
days, I’ll direct those agencies to begin the process of delisting marijuana
via the federal rule-making process. And I’ll reinstate the Obama
administration’s guidance on deferring to state policy on marijuana
enforcement to prevent uncertainty in the states while legalization is
pending at the federal level.33

These promises to legalize marijuana in short order through executive
action were praised by many (though not all) fans of legalization.34
Of course, neither Sanders nor Warren appeared to benefit much from
these bold promises, as former Vice President Joe Biden eventually won
the Democratic nomination (and the Presidency) without committing

marijuana.
31. Tom Angell, Bernie Sanders Pledges Legal Marijuana in All 50 States on Day One as
President, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2020/02/01/bernie-sanderspledges-legal-marijuana-in-all-50-states-on-day-one-as-president/#1a5443391c16 (quoting Sanders).
32. See BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30.
33. A Just and Equitable Cannabis Industry, ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/cannabis [https://perma.cc/CU9U-V4NZ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
34. E.g., David Dayen, Sanders and Warren Vow to Legalize Marijuana Through Executive
Action, THE AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 24, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/sanders-warren-vowto-legalize-marijuana/ (“Legalizing marijuana, and putting an end to a harmful drug war that has trapped
millions of people in a spiral of incarceration and hardship, would be very powerful, and the option of
taking executive action makes it more feasible.”). But see, e.g., Matt Welch, Op-Ed: Can’t remove the
President from Power? Do the Reverse: Remove Power from the President, LA TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-02-06/executive-power-impeachment-donald-trump-joebiden (“Legalizing marijuana is a wonderful and long-overdue idea, but Sanders’ way of getting there is
not. Federal law, including the odious Controlled Substances Act, is constitutionally required to originate
from or be struck down by either Congress or constitutional amendment.”).
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himself to legalizing marijuana through executive action.35 Nonetheless,
the calls for executive action to legalize marijuana are unlikely to subside
as long as the federal ban remains on the books.
II. THE LIMITS ON POTUS’S POWER TO LEGALIZE POT
How exactly would a President legalize marijuana through executive
action? Not surprisingly, the campaign promises mentioned above were
short on specifics, but they appear to contemplate taking either or both of
two actions: utilize the Attorney General’s authority under the CSA to deschedule marijuana, and/or suspend enforcement of federal laws that
restrict marijuana-related activities. As explained below, however, neither
action is presently authorized by statute or the Constitution.
A. The President Cannot Swiftly De-schedule Marijuana Under the CSA
Senators Sanders and Warren both assumed that, as President, they
could simply order the Attorney General to de-schedule marijuana.36 To
appreciate this tactic and to grasp why the President could not actually do
this, it is necessary to explain the CSA’s byzantine scheduling system. 37
The CSA assigns all psychoactive drugs with abuse potential to one of
five Schedules (I-V). Scheduling determines how a drug is regulated. The
statute makes it a federal crime to manufacture, distribute, or even possess
Schedule I drugs, at least outside the narrow confines of a federally
approved research study. The CSA authorizes the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of drugs on the other schedules for medical
purposes, but it still subjects those drugs to a sliding scale of regulatory
controls, with Schedule II drugs (like cocaine) being the most heavily
restricted and Schedule V drugs (like Robitussin) the least. 38
35. Biden has taken a more equivocal stance on legalization, although he appears to support nonenforcement of the federal ban, which is one form of executive action arguably contemplated by Senator
Warren, as discussed below. See Combating the Climate Crisis and Pursuing Environmental Justice,
BIDEN-SANDERS
UNITY
TASK
FORCE
9
(Aug.
2020),
https://joebiden.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf (“We will support
legalization of medical marijuana, and believe states should be able to make their own decisions about
recreational use. The Justice Department should not launch federal prosecutions of conduct that is legal
at the state level.”).
36. On his website, for example, Senator Sanders explained that he would “Immediately issu[e]
an executive order that directs the Attorney General to declassify marijuana as a controlled substance.”
BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30. For her part, Senator Warren indicated that, as
President, she would “direct [the relevant] agencies to begin the process of delisting marijuana via the
federal rule-making process.” ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33.
37. For a more thorough discussion of the CSA’s scheduling process and criteria, see MIKOS,
supra note 28, at 272-77.
38. See
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES
(2020),
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/e_cs_sched.pdf (providing list of controlled
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When Congress passed the CSA in 1970, it made the initial scheduling
assignments for each drug covered by the statute. It placed marijuana on
Schedule I, reflecting its view at the time that the drug was harmful and
had no redeeming medical utility because it had not yet been
demonstrated to treat any medical condition.39 However, Congress also
empowered the Attorney General, working in consultation with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), to re-schedule or even
de-schedule a drug, when new scientific evidence suggested the change
was warranted, such as when science suggested the drug no longer fit the
criteria of the Schedule to which it had previously been assigned.40
De-scheduling would remove marijuana from the ambit of the CSA.
Marijuana suppliers would no longer face various sanctions that follow
automatically from marijuana’s present status as a Schedule I drug,
including not only the CSA’s criminal sanctions, but also the tax penalties
the Internal Revenue Code imposes on unlawful drug dealers. Descheduling would also ease access to banking services for the licensed
marijuana industry because the proceeds of marijuana sales would no
longer be considered tainted. In fact, if the drug were de-scheduled and
the CSA no longer applied to marijuana, most of the sanctions that federal
law now imposes on marijuana-related activities would go away.41 In
short, de-scheduling really would legalize marijuana under federal law,
both for medical and recreational use.
But there are several limitations on the Executive’s scheduling
authority under the CSA, which make legalizing marijuana through
administrative de-scheduling a pipe dream. To illustrate, consider just
three of those limitations.
First, the CSA’s scheduling criteria make it impossible to
administratively de-schedule any drug that is commonly used for
recreational purposes because the CSA equates recreational drug use with
drug abuse.42 Additionally, the statute requires that all drugs with abuse

substances by Schedule).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (enumerating criteria for inclusion on each Schedule).
40. The Attorney General has delegated most of its scheduling authority to the Drug Enforcement
Administration. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b). The Secretary of Health and Human Services has delegated its
function to the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institute of Drug Abuse.
41. Most, but not all. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act would still likely prohibit the sale of
CBD, one of the chemicals commonly found in marijuana, for human consumption. See generally Sean
M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After
Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019).
42. See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ASSESSMENT OF ABUSE POTENTIAL OF DRUGS: GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/116739/download (“Drug abuse is defined as
the intentional, non-therapeutic use of a drug product or substance, even once, to achieve a desired
psychological or physiological effect.”); DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Basis for the
Recommendation for Maintaining Marijuana in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 81 Fed. Reg.
53690, 53690 (Aug. 12, 2016) (noting that one factor demonstrating that a drug has a potential for abuse
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potential be placed on one of its five schedules. 43 To be sure, the CSA
assigns drugs with a relatively low potential for abuse (like Robitussin) to
one of the lower Schedules (III-V). But drugs with a low potential for
abuse are still “controlled substances” and may not be removed altogether
from the ambit of the statute.44 In other words, they must still be
controlled.
Notably, Congress made only two exceptions to the general rule that
all recreational drugs must be controlled under the CSA. Namely, it
declared in the statute that “The term ‘controlled substance’ . . . does not
include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco.” 45 Without this
express statutory exemption, both alcohol and tobacco would now be
subject to the controls imposed by the CSA. Indeed, the statute would
probably prohibit the manufacture, distribution, and possession of alcohol
and tobacco, because both have a high potential for abuse and lack any
redeeming medical utility—making them appropriate for inclusion on
Schedule I.46 The fact that Congress felt it necessary to exempt alcohol
and tobacco from the list of controlled substances reinforces the notion
that it would take an act of Congress to remove any other recreational
drug. Therefore, the Attorney General does not have the authority to deschedule marijuana on their own.
Just to be clear, I believe marijuana is less dangerous than the other
drugs on Schedule I, and many drugs on lower schedules as well. But
recognizing that marijuana’s abuse potential is lower than that of other
controlled substances does not somehow empower the Attorney General
to remove the drug from the CSA administratively. At most, it merely
enables the Attorney General to move marijuana to one of the lower
schedules.47 But while rescheduling marijuana would legalize the drug
is that “Individuals are taking the drug . . . on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical
advice“).
43. The statute defines “controlled substance” in circular fashion, as “a drug or other substance . .
. included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). In other words, a “controlled substance” is
one that is subject to controls. However, “potential for abuse” appears to be a key part of that definition,
because it is one of the prime criteria for scheduling. Id. at § 812(b).
44. Id. at § 811(a)(2) (declaring that the Attorney General may remove a drug from the list of
controlled substances only if the drug “does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule”).
45. Id. at § 802(6).
46. Id. at § 812(b).
47. The Attorney General might not even be able to do that, because the statute requires
demonstrating that a controlled substance has medical utility – i.e., that is has been demonstrated to treat
some medical condition effectively – to move it off of Schedule I. That has been a sticking point in
previous attempts to reschedule marijuana. For example, the last time the DEA rejected a petition to
reschedule marijuana, it observed that
Congress established one schedule, schedule I, for drugs of abuse with ‘no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.’ . . . Thus, any attempt to compare the relative abuse
potential of a schedule I substance to that of a substance in another schedule is inconsequential,
since a schedule I substance must remain in schedule I until it has been found to have a currently
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for medical use, it would not legalize the drug for recreational purposes,
as Presidential hopefuls Sanders and Warren promised to do via executive
action.
Second, the CSA requires the Attorney General to comply with
international drug control treaties when making scheduling decisions. In
particular, Section 811(d)(1) states that, “If control is required by United
States obligations under international treaties . . . the Attorney General
shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems
most appropriate to carry out such obligations.”48 In effect, this provision
incorporates international law into domestic law.
Section 811(d)(1) effectively bars the Attorney General from descheduling marijuana, because international treaties oblige member
nations to ban recreational use of all drugs.49 The International Narcotics
Control Board, which monitors treaty compliance for the United Nations,
has already warned that the “the legalization of non-medical use of
cannabis contravenes the international drug control treaties.” 50 Hence, as
long as international drug control treaties require member nations to ban
recreational marijuana – or at least, as long as the United States remains
a party to such treaties – the Attorney General, and by extension the
President, would lack the power to remove marijuana from the CSA.
This constraint on the executive branch’s scheduling authority has been
misunderstood and overlooked. For example, John Hudak of the
Brookings Institution has recently suggested that “The Single Convention
[on Narcotics] has absolutely no impact on President Sanders’s or any
president’s ability” to legalize marijuana, reasoning that while the
international conventions bar member states from legalizing marijuana,
“there’s really no enforcement mechanism in international organizations
to do anything about it.”51 Hudak is undoubtedly correct that the United
States would face no sanctions for violating its obligations under
international drug control conventions. But he fails to realize that an
executive order to de-schedule marijuana would not just violate
international law, it would violate domestic law as well. In fact, the D.C.

accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.
Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53688, 53747 (Aug. 12,
2016).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1) (emphasis added).
49. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 Art. 28,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/Ebook/The_Inter
national_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9H54-GYSQ].
50. INT’L
NARCOTICS
CONTROL
BD.,
2018
ANNUAL
REPORT
11,
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2018.html.
51. Kyle Jaeger, Could Bernie Sanders Actually Legalize Marijuana Nationwide on Day One as
President?, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/could-berniesanders-actually-legalize-marijuana-nationwide-on-day-one-as-president/ (quoting Hudak).
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Circuit, one of the most prominent federal courts of appeals, has held that
Section 811(d)(1) effectively bars the Attorney General even from
moving marijuana below Schedule II of CSA.52
Of course, the President could remove this limitation on the Attorney
General’s scheduling authority by withdrawing the United States from the
international drug control treaties. 53 But withdrawing from the treaties
would be a drastic step, and it is not one that anyone has seriously
contemplated, whether as part of a plan to legalize marijuana through
executive action or otherwise.
Third, apart from the substantive constraints just discussed, Congress
has also imposed some procedural requirements that would make it
impossible to de-schedule marijuana on the aggressive timeline
envisioned by Senator Sanders. For one thing, before issuing any
scheduling decision, the Attorney General would first have to seek the
Secretary of Health and Human Services’ written “scientific and medical
evaluation” of marijuana54–basically, the Secretary’s opinion on
marijuana’s abuse potential, its medical utility, and its dependence
liability. Furthermore, the Attorney General would have to defer to the
Secretary’s findings when making their scheduling decision.55 That could
pose a problem if the Secretary is unwilling to certify that marijuana has
no abuse potential. In addition, the Attorney General must also comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which, among other
things, requires giving the public notice of and an opportunity to comment
upon any proposed rule to reschedule marijuana. 56
While these procedural hurdles are not insurmountable, it would take
time to complete each of these steps. Consider that it took the DEA and
FDA nearly five years to complete their response to the last petition to reschedule marijuana.57 The aggressive timetable envisioned by Senator
Sanders, promising legalization anywhere from 1 to 100 days after
inauguration, is wildly optimistic. It would be impossible for the agencies
involved to satisfy the procedural requirements of the CSA and APA in
such a short period of time. Recognizing that it would take time, perhaps
even years, to de-schedule marijuana administratively reduces the appeal
of legalizing marijuana via executive action.
There are other limits on the Attorney General’s scheduling authority
52. Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 559
F.2d 735, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing the limitations on the DEA’s scheduling authority stemming
from treaty obligations).
53. Withdrawing from the conventions likely would not require congressional assent. Cf.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).
55. Id.
56. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq.
57. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 42.
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under the CSA, but these examples should suffice to show that the
President may not legalize marijuana for recreational use by descheduling the drug, at least in the short time frame envisioned by
proponents of executive action.
B. The President Cannot Suspend Enforcement of All Federal Laws
Restricting Marijuana
A second possibility would be to leave the federal ban on the books,
but to stop enforcing that ban. Senator Warren indicated that nonenforcement would be part of her strategy to legalize marijuana via
executive action, alongside de-scheduling. (Senator Sanders did not
mention non-enforcement during his campaign, perhaps trusting that his
plan to swiftly de-schedule would make enforcement a non-issue.) In
particular, she indicated that she would “reinstate the Obama
administration’s guidance on deferring to state policy on marijuana
enforcement.”58
During the Obama Administration, the senior leadership of the DOJ
issued a series of enforcement memoranda to all United States Attorneys.
In a nutshell, these memoranda encouraged federal prosecutors not to
pursue legal action against marijuana traffickers who comply with “strong
and effective” state regulations, so long as their violations do not
implicate other federal enforcement priorities, such as preventing “the
distribution of marijuana to minors.”59 In other words, as long as no state
law was violated, the DOJ should not prosecute federal marijuana crimes.
While the Obama non-enforcement policy did not remove the federal
marijuana ban from the code books, it lessened one of the biggest
concerns facing state-licensed marijuana suppliers—the threat of federal
criminal prosecution. In so doing, it helped spur the creation of the statelicensed marijuana industry we have today. As I have observed elsewhere,
the memoranda “signaled that the federal government was willing to call
a ‘Truce’ in its longstanding war on marijuana.”60 After the first
memorandum was announced in 2009, states began to authorize and
regulate the commercial production and sale of marijuana, something they
had been reluctant to do while the DOJ was still enforcing the federal

58. ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33.
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Att’y General, to U.S. Att'ys on Guidance
Regarding
Marijuana
Enforcement,
1
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. See also Robert A. Mikos, A
Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 633 (2011) (analyzing DOJ enforcement guidance).
60. Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER
L. REV. 1, 10 (2020).
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ban.61 And once the states authorized the commercial supply of
marijuana, thousands of private companies lined up to grow and sell the
drug under the watchful eye of state regulators.62 Simply put, the policy
achieved a form of de-facto legalization.63
But the DOJ non-enforcement policy was limited, just like the spending
restrictions Congress would later impose on the agency (discussed
above). While it effectively mooted the criminal sanctions enforced by
the DOJ, the DOJ policy did not lift any of the civil sanctions enforced by
other federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, which
continued to apply the tax code’s punitive accounting rules against the
state-licensed marijuana industry;64 the Federal Reserve, which continued
to limit access to federal payment systems for banks serving the
industry;65 the Patent and Trademark Office, which continued to refuse
registration of trademarks used on marijuana products;66 and the
Department of Veterans Affairs, which continued to bar its physicians
from recommending marijuana to their patients.67
To suspend all the sanctions federal law now imposes on marijuana
activities would require a more audacious program of non-enforcement,
one that coordinates the enforcement activity of a broad cadre of actors
including, but not limited to, the DOJ. Perhaps Senator Warren had such
coordination in mind when she promised to “appoint agency heads
including at the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, who support legalization.”68 But achieving
de facto legalization through a coordinated strategy of non-enforcement
is both impractical and unconstitutional.
61. Id. at 5-8.
62. Colorado alone has licensed more than 1,000 firms to cultivate, process, and / or distribute
medical or recreational marijuana. See MED Resources and Statistics, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/med-resources-and-statistics (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
63. Although the enforcement memoranda were rescinded by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in
early 2018, the DOJ has not changed its enforcement practices. In other words, it still turns a blind eye to
violations of the federal marijuana ban, albeit it is less open and transparent about it. See Robert A. Mikos,
Jeff Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Enforcement Guidance: Five Observations, MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, &
AUTHORITY BLOG (Jan. 5, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/01/jeff-sessions-rescindsobama-era-enforcement-guidance-six-observations/.
64. See Leff, supra note 20.
65. See Hill, supra note 17, at 627-30.
66. See In re PharmaCann, LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1124 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (“We must
determine the eligibility of marijuana-related marks for federal registration by reference to the CSA as it
is written, not as it might be enforced at any point in time by any particular Justice Department.”).
67. VA and Marijuana—What Veterans Need to Know, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.publichealth.va.gov/marijuana.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
68. ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33. It is worth noting, however that
neither Warren nor Sanders has explicitly called for expanding the scope of the Obama Administration
non-enforcement policy.
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It is impractical because the President wields only partial control over
the sanctions federal law now imposes on marijuana activities. Most
obviously, the President cannot stop private parties from using the federal
ban in litigation with marijuana suppliers (and users). For example,
private plaintiffs have sued state-licensed marijuana businesses under the
federal civil RICO statute, alleging that sales of marijuana constitute
racketeering activity, for which they can recover treble damages. 69 Private
parties have also used the federal marijuana ban as a defense to
infringement of trademarks owned by marijuana businesses.70 Even the
President’s ability to control officials of the federal government is far
from absolute. For example, the President could not simply order the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve to change Fed policy and start offering
marijuana banks access to federal payment systems.71 In short, it may
prove impossible to effectively legalize marijuana by ignoring the federal
ban—in other words, without formally removing the ban from the code
books.
Such an aggressive non-enforcement policy would also be
unconstitutional because it would usurp Congress’s legislative power. In
effect, Senators Warren and Sanders promised to nullify federal statutes
that Congress duly enacted pursuant to its constitutional authority. 72 The
Obama policy raised similar separation of powers concerns, but that
policy was easier to defend because it was limited in scope. The
memoranda issued by the DOJ during the Obama Administration did not
purport to legalize marijuana, and, as noted above, those memoranda
contained several provisos, i.e., they did not purport to suspend all
enforcement of the federal marijuana ban. 73 Indeed, to a large extent, the
Obama policy simply reflected the reality that United States Attorneys
must ignore some violations of federal law because Congress has not
provided the DOJ enough resources to prosecute every violation—not
even close.74
69. See sources cited supra, note 22. For more details on the application of the federal civil RICO
statute to the cannabis industry, see Mikos, supra note 59, at 649-56.
70. Kiva Health Brands LLC v. Kiva Brands Inc., 439 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(“When a mark is used for cannabis products, the Lanham Act does not recognize the user's trademark
priority.”).
71. It is questionable whether the President could even get all United States Attorneys to suspend
enforcement of the federal marijuana ban. See Mikos, supra note 59, at 643-46 (illuminating limits on
Attorney General’s ability to control local federal prosecutors).
72. See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding CSA’s ban on marijuana as valid exercise
of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).
73. See Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law
Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. REV. 183 (2016).
74. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1463-69 (2009) (explaining that
the federal government currently only has enough law enforcement resources to prosecute a tiny fraction
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I recognize there is no bright line separating the President’s power to
enforce the law from Congress’s power to make the law. When examined
closely, many enforcement decisions resemble acts of legislation. But
wherever the line may be drawn between the executive and the legislative
powers, a Presidential order suspending enforcement of all congressional
statutes governing marijuana, just because the President disagrees with
the policy behind those statutes, would test the outer limits of even the
most capacious definition of executive authority.
A couple of examples will help to show why a broad non-enforcement
strategy would exceed the scope of presidential authority. Consider, first,
Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, the provision that bars
marijuana suppliers from deducting certain expenses when calculating
their federal taxes. In relevant part, Section 280E states that,
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or
business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists
of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I
and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal
law. . . .75

The language of this provision is mandatory. It does not give the IRS
discretion to ignore its directives; for example, it says that “No deduction
. . shall be allowed” for certain types of expenses.76 While scholars and
tax practitioners have devised clever schemes to try to circumvent Section
280E (none has worked thus far),77 no one has suggested that the IRS
could simply ignore this provision of the tax code and treat marijuana
suppliers like other federally lawful businesses.
Or consider the federal Bankruptcy Code. The United States Trustee
insists that state-licensed marijuana business may not petition for
bankruptcy relief, in part because a bankruptcy trustee might be required
“to violate federal criminal law”, say, if it were forced to liquidate the
business’s inventory and sell its marijuana.78 Taken at face value, the
Trustee’s objection suggests that an aggressive non-enforcement policy
would entail more than just turning a blind eye to violations of federal
law; in some cases, it might entail participating in such violations as
of all federal marijuana crimes).
75. 26 U.S.C. § 280E.
76. Section 280E is thus consistent with other rules that limit the IRS’s authority to shape federal
tax policy. See generally James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235
(2015) (recognizing, but also critiquing, rules limiting the IRS’s policy-making authority).
77. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 20; Robert A. Mikos, Interesting New Tax Court Decision on Section
280E,
MARIJUANA
L.,
POL’Y,
&
AUTHORITY
BLOG
(Jan.
23,
2019),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2019/01/564/.
78. Clifford J. White, III & John Shehan, Why Marijuana Assets May Not be Administered in
Bankruptcy , https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/abi_201712.pdf/download (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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well.79
In sum, the President’s authority to legalize marijuana through
executive action is far more limited than Presidential aspirants and
marijuana legalization advocates have previously acknowledged. Issuing
an executive order to immediately legalize marijuana, either by descheduling the drug or by suspending enforcement of existing laws,
would be unavailing and unlawful.
III. THE DANGERS OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
Although legalizing marijuana through executive action would be
unlawful, reform proponents might still be tempted to try it. After all,
there may be no litigant who would have standing to challenge any of the
executive actions considered above, such as a Presidential order to deschedule marijuana, or to stop enforcing Section 280E against the
marijuana industry.80 The realization that the President might get away
with it could embolden the push to pursue legalization through executive
action, especially since relatively pro-reform Democrats captured only a
slim majority in Congress in the 2020 election.
Tempting as it is, however, advocates of reform should eschew the idea
of legalizing marijuana through executive action. Ignoring the limits on
Presidential power discussed above takes us further down the path of the
imperial presidency, with consequences that could reverberate far beyond
marijuana policy. An example from the Trump Administration should
serve to illustrate some of the risks involved. 81
79. In analyzing whether state marijuana reforms are preempted, for example, I have explained
that there is a big difference between state laws that merely tolerate federal crimes, e.g., those that repeal
state sanctions on marijuana trafficking, and state laws that actively facilitate those crimes, e.g., those that
call for the state to operate a marijuana dispensary. See Mikos, supra note 74, at 1453-60.
80. Even members of Congress likely would not have standing to challenge such orders. See
generally Vicki Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in U.S.
Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L. J. 845 (2018).
81. There are other examples from current and past Administrations that reinforce the point. For
instance, President Trump has attempted to nullify the Johnson Amendment, a 1954 congressional tax
statute that bars non-profit organizations, including churches, from campaigning directly on behalf of
candidates in political elections. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Congress has refused to repeal the Amendment,
but Trump has vowed to “destroy” it, and he has even issued an Executive Order that urged the IRS to
ignore the Amendment (though without much effect). See Salvador Rizzo, President Trump’s Shifting
Claim that ‘we got rid’ of the Johnson Amendment, WASH. POST (May 9, 2019).
The Obama Administration also utilized non-enforcement to achieve some of its policy goals. Apart from
suspending enforcement of the federal marijuana ban, President Obama also suspended enforcement of
the removal provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act against between 800,000 and
1,800,000 undocumented immigrants who had been brought to this country when they were minors. Many
conservatives claimed that President Obama had thereby usurped Congress’s legislative authority and
disregarded his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty &
John C. Woo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (“The President’s claim of prosecutorial
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In late August 2020, less than three months before the 2020 presidential
election, the Secretary of HHS announced that the agency was granting
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to treat COVID-19 with
convalescent plasma.82 Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) imposes demanding scientific criteria for approving new
treatments—criteria that would normally take years to satisfy—83the
statute authorizes the Secretary to permit the use of an unapproved
treatment during a public health emergency, as long as a set of somewhat
lower standards are met. Namely, the FDCA provides that the Secretary
may issue an EUA if, after reviewing “the totality of scientific evidence”
and consulting with the heads of multiple agencies, the Secretary
determines that the new drug “may be effective in . . . treating” the illness
creating the emergency, and the “known and potential benefits” of the
medicine “outweigh the known and potential risks.”84
While the Secretary touted convalescent plasma as a “major therapeutic
breakthrough,” “the manner in which the EUA was granted raised a series
of questions about the agency’s independence from political pressure.”85
Scientists from around the world, including one of the scientists who had
been conducting clinical trials on convalescent plasma, claimed that the
Secretary had “grossly mispresented” the efficacy of the treatment and
the preliminary data gleaned from those trials. 86 Even senior career
federal health officials warned that the data did not yet support issuing the
EUA.87 Doubts about the soundness of the Secretary’s decision were
fueled by President Trump’s attempts to pressure the agency to approve
the treatment.88 Trump had hyped the promise of convalescent plasma
long before the HHS issued the EUA,89 and in the days leading up to the
Secretary’s announcement, the President had openly criticized the agency
discretion in immigration matters threatens to vest the Executive Branch with broad domestic policy
authority that the Constitution does not grant it.”).
82. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EUA 26382: EMERGENCY USE AUTHORITY REQUEST FOR COVID-19
CONVALESCENT PLASMA, https://www.fda.gov/media/141480/download.
83. The criteria for approval of new drugs are found in 21 U.S.C. § 355.
84. Id. at § 360 (c)(2)(A), (B).
85. Rachel Sachs, Understanding the FDA’s Controversial Convalescent Plasma Authorization,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
BLOG
(Aug.
27,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200827.190308/full/.
86. Katie Thomas & Sheri Fink, F.D.A. ‘Grossly Misrepresented’ Blood Plasma Data, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/health/fda-blood-plasma.html.
The accusations prompted the Secretary to walk back some of the claims that had been made during a
press conference announcing the EUA. Id.
87. See Noah Weiland et al., F.D.A.’s Emergency Approval of Blood Plasma Is Now on Hold, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/blood-plasma-covid-19.html.
88. See id.
89. See Katie Thomas & Noah Weiland, As Trump Praises Plasma, Researchers Struggle to Finish
Critical Studies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/health/trumpplasma.html.
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for taking too much time to approve the treatment. 90 While the Secretary
insisted that he made the EUA decision based on science, and not politics,
his assurances did not quell the controversy. 91
Whether he had any influence or not, the President’s attempt to dictate
the outcome of the FDCA drug approval process has obvious harms. It
undermines the integrity of the administrative process Congress designed
to assess the safety and efficacy of new drugs and treatments. 92 In the
wake of this controversy, for example, the American public has expressed
growing distrust of the process now being used to assess the safety and
efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines. Between May and September 2020, the
percentage of Americans who said they would get vaccinated dropped
from seventy-two percent (72%) to fifty-one percent (51%),93 a trend
which greatly hinders the prospects for returning to the old normal once
a vaccine is approved.
President Trump’s push to approve COVID-19 treatments (and a
vaccine) bears more than a passing resemblance to the push to legalize
marijuana through executive action discussed earlier. Both are motivated
by a desire to enact a popular policy—expanding access to marijuana or
to a COVID-19 treatment—more quickly than would be possible (if at
all) if the executive branch followed the administrative process required
by congressional statutes. In so doing, both pushes threaten to undermine
public trust in the careful processes Congress has established to approve
and control drugs and medical treatments.
I recognize that those processes may be flawed. The CSA, for example,
myopically focuses on the medical use of drugs and recognizes no social
value whatsoever in the recreational use of psychoactive substances. 94
The statute, in fact, considers all recreational use to be a harm, as
explained earlier. A strong argument can be made that we should revise
the CSA to accommodate non-medical use of drugs. In similar fashion,
90. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 85 (“‘The deep state, or whoever, over at the FDA is making it
very difficult for drug companies to get people in order to test the vaccines and therapeutics. Obviously,
they are hoping to delay the answer until after November 3rd.’”) (quoting tweet from President Trump).
91. Id. (observing that “it is difficult to disentangle [the EUA decision] from the overt political
pressure imposed by the President regarding both this therapy and others”).
92. Id. (noting that trust is “One of the most valuable assets of the FDA”).
93. Alec Tyson et al., U.S. Public Now Divided Over Whether to Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-dividedover-whether-to-get-covid-19-vaccine/.
94. Oddly, HHS has acknowledged that marijuana use is “pleasurable to many humans.” Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., supra note 42, at 53693. The agency has also surmised that marijuana use causes
“Increased merriment . . . and even exhilaration”, “Disinhibition, relaxation, increased sociability, and
talkativeness”, “Enhanced sensory perception, which can generate an increased appreciation of music, art
and touch,” and “Heightened imagination which can lead to a subjective sense of increased creativity.”
Id. at 53693-94. However, rather than viewing these effects as evidence of marijuana’s benefits, the
agency instead considers them evidence of marijuana’s harms, because they demonstrate the drug’s high
potential for abuse – i.e., its appeal as a recreational drug.
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perhaps we should lower the bar for approving experimental treatments,
especially during national health emergencies like the current pandemic.
But these are policy changes that Congress needs to make; they are not
changes the President can (or should) pursue unilaterally, in disregard of
the limitations imposed by congressional statutes.
Entertaining proposals to legalize marijuana through executive action
ultimately draws attention away from what is needed to reform federal
marijuana policy: the adoption of new congressional legislation.
Suggesting that the President could somehow legalize marijuana without
Congress likely only reduces the urgency for Congress to act. After all, it
enables members of Congress to shift some of the blame for the
persistence of the federal marijuana ban onto the President, rather than
taking full responsibility for that ban, as they should.
New congressional legislation will also be necessary if, as many
believe it should, the federal government is to regulate, and not just
legalize, marijuana. For example, both Senator Sanders and Senator
Warren have suggested that the federal government should tax marijuana
sales and redistribute the tax proceeds to communities that were
disproportionately harmed by the war on drugs.95 Senator Sanders has
urged the federal government to impose caps on the concentration of the
legal marijuana industry to prevent the rise of another Big Tobacco. 96 But
these policies could not be adopted through executive action alone, and
to their credit, neither Sanders nor Warren has ever suggested this would
be possible. In short, it will take passage of new legislation, like the
MORE Act, to both legalize marijuana and establish a more just
regulatory regime to govern the substance at the federal level.
Marshalling legislative reform through Congress will, of course, take
time. But the deliberateness of the federal lawmaking process is a feature
of our constitutional structure, not a design defect. Requiring all
legislation to be passed through Congress is one way the Constitution
helps to protect individual liberty and our federal system of government. 97
Bypassing that process to achieve short-term policy goals – to accelerate
the legalization of marijuana at the federal level – is fraught with
ramifications that extend far beyond the narrow context of marijuana.

95. BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30; ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN
WEBSITE, supra note 33.
96. BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30.
97. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013)
(“What we commonly call ‘gridlock’ is not necessarily a sign of constitutional dysfunction.”).
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